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I. INTRODUCTION
Sexually charged evidence-admitted under a consciousness of guilt
theory-is utilized to convict women based on their character and not for
their alleged crimes in criminal cases across the nation. This form of evi-
dence is biased because it exploits common gender stereotypes in an ef-
* Colin Caffrey is an attorney. He wishes to thank his friends and family for their
advice and encouragement during this process.
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fort to obtain criminal convictions. This Article begins by giving a brief
background illustrating this type of consciousness of guilt evidence and
then discusses the evidentiary theory under which it is admitted. Next, it
will explain why this sexually charged evidence is biased against women.
The Article will conclude by arguing that this type of evidence should be
excluded.
II. BACKGROUND
Two recent cause c616bres' illustrate the use of this evidence. In both
cases, the prosecution used the defendants' supposedly inappropriate sex-
ual behavior after the alleged crime as evidence of their consciousness of
guilt.2 By using the sexually charged evidence, the prosecution exploited
gender stereotypes.
In a Florida case, the female defendant faced sexually charged evi-
dence presented by the prosecutors that suggested she went out partying
after she allegedly killed her daughter.' Prosecutors presented to the jury
photos depicting the defendant entering a "hot body" contest and show-
ing her dressed in a tight blue dress and boots.' Witnesses testified that
after the alleged murder, when the defendant's daughter was purported
1. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cause%20
c616bre (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (defining "cause c6l6bres" as "a legal case that excites
widespread interest.").
2. See generally Melanie Michael, Party Pictures Show Casey Anthony Grinding on the
Dance Floor, WTSP NEWS (May 26, 2011), http://www.wtsp.com/news/local/story.aspx?
storyid=194015 (describing the prosecution's perspective on the infamous Casey Anthony
case, arguing that Casey had a motive for killing her daughter: to live the life she really
wanted); Josh Mankiewicz, Cindy Sommer's Long Vindication, NBC NEws (Apr. 25, 2008,
2:06 PM), http://insidedateline.nbcnews.com/ news/2008/04/25/4374269-cindy-sommers-
long-vindication?lite (evidencing how Sommer's suspicious behavior was used to demon-
strate consciousness of guilt in the case against her for killing her Marine husband).
3. See Michael, supra note 2 (presenting the prosecution's argument that the defen-
dant could now "live the life she wanted without Caylee [defendant's missing daughter] in
the picture."); see also Ashleigh Banfield & Jessica Hopper, Casey Anthony Trial: Former
Boyfriend Describes Casey Anthony Romance, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2011), http://abcnews.
go.com/US/casey-anthony-trial-tony-lazzaro-describes-romance-caylee/story?id=13682814
(characterizing the prosecution's evidence as "a veritable scrapbook of Anthony's clubbing
during the month her daughter was missing.").
4. See Michael, supra note 2 ("The pictures show Casey Anthony partying in a short,
tight-fitting blue dress. She is seen also wearing thigh-high black boots and grinding on the
dance floor at an Orlando club called Fusion."); see also Stephen Loiaconi, Prosecutor:
"Whose Life Was Better Without Caylee?", HLN (March 7, 2012, 9:12 PM), http://www.
hintv.com/article/2011/07/04/prosecutor-whose-life-was-better-without-caylee (describing a
"split-screen with a photo of Casey partying at a night club on one side and[,] a close-up of
the 'Bella Vita' tattoo that she got weeks after Caylee died on the other" shown to the jury
during the prosecution's case in chief).
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to be missing, the defendant did not appear to be worried or scared.'
Witnesses further testified the defendant was living with a man.6 The
prosecution used this testimony as evidence of defendant's consciousness
of guilt,' by repeatedly referencing how "indifferently"' the defendant
acted during their closing statement-including showing a picture of the
defendant partying.' The prosecution also stated that the defendant was
not a good mother.' 0
5. See Casey Anthony Trial: Suspect Called a 'Fun Party Girl' During Second Day of
Testimony, HUwINorON Pos-r (Jan. 19, 2012, 10:23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011 /05/25/casey-anthony-trial-fun-party-girln_867189.htmI ("Lezniewicz testified that he
never saw Anthony upset or depressed and he mentioned a trip to a nightclub on June 20,
2008, at which Anthony participated in a "hot body contest" during a nightclub promo-
tion."); see also Testimony: Casey Anthony Partied While Girl Was Missing, USA TooAv
(May 25, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-05-25-casey-
anthony-trial-n.htm (according to witness testimony, Anthony "never appeared worried,
depressed[,] or angry" during the time her toddler-aged daughter was missing).
6, Michael, supra note 2; see also Testimony: Casey Anthony Partied While Girl Was
Missing, USA ToDAY (May 25, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/na-
tion/2011-05-25-casey-anthony-trial-n.htm ("In late May of 2008, Anthony met Tony
Lazaro during a party. They soon became romantically involved and she moved into an
apartment he was sharing with four other people.").
7. See Stephen Loiaconi, Prosecutor: "Whose Life Was Better Without Caylee?," H LN
(March 7, 2012, 9:12 PM), http://www.hlntv.com/article/2011/07/04/prosecutor-whose-life-
was-better-without-caylee ("While Baez [Anthony's defense attorney] had dismissed testi-
mony about Casey's behavior during the [thirty-one] days between when her daughter
Caylee was last seen and when she was reported missing as 'irrelevant,' Burdick [the prose-
cutor] said her actions suggested a consciousness of guilt, not grieving.").
8. See id. (noting that thirty-one days had passed between Caylee's disappearance and
when Casey reported the disappearance); see also Gage Lester, Thomas v. State: Evidence
of a Defendant's Refusal to Provide a Blood Sample is Inadmissible to Show Consciousness
of Guilt, 33 U. BAur. L.F. 37, 37 (2003) (defining consciousness of guilt as "a person's post-
crime behavior."). Compare State v. Pepshi, 745 A.2d 494, 496 (N.J. 1999) (disagreeing
with the idea that acceptance of draconian conduct or indifference to arrest indicate con-
sciousness of guilt) with State v. Pindale, 592 A.2d 300, 310 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (claiming that unexplained flight, switching clothes before a lineup, and an unusual
showing of remorse for the victim are intrinsically indicative of consciousness of guilt).
9. See Loiaconi, supra note 7 (showing a up close photo of Casey's tattoo reading
"Bella Vita" she got shortly after Caylee's death); see also Ashleigh Banfield & Jessica
Hopper, Casey Anthony Trial: Former Boyfriend Describes Casey Anthony Romance, ABC
Niews (May 25, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/casey-anthony-trial-tony-lazzaro-de-
scribes-romance-caylee/story?id=13682814 (stating that prosecutors entered into evidence
several pictures of Casey at nightclubs during the month her daughter was missing).
10. See Marisol Bello & William M. Welch, How the Casey Anthony Case Came Apart,
USA ToDAY (July 7, 2011, 10:57 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-
07-05-Casey-Anthony-Caylee-Anthony-acquittal-murder-case-Florida n.htm (claiming
that the Anthony case was the "social media" trial of the century and the public was won-
dering what kind of mother parties while her daughter is missing).
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Another recent case from California shows the use of such evidence
against women. Although admitted because of defense attorney error,
the prosecution used the evidence to show consciousness of guilt." In
the case, Cynthia Sommer, was accused of murdering her husband,
Marine Sgt. Todd.' 2 As part of its argument, the prosecution told the jury
of her visits to Tijuana, Mexico." They highlighted her participation in a
wet t-shirt contest where she flashed the crowd," her sexual encounters
with other men after her husband's death," and her breast augmenta-
tion." In sum, the prosecution used the evidence specifically to show
that the defendant was behaving inappropriately after her husband's
death,' 7 arguing that she was celebrating rather than grieving."
11. See Josh Mankiewicz, Cindy Sommer's Long Vindication, NBC NEws (Apr. 25,
2008, 2:06 PM), http://insidedateline.nbcnews.com/_news/2008/04/25/4374269-cindy-som-
mers-long-vindication?lite (using evidence of purchasing breast implants, sleeping around
with other Marines, and participating in a wet t-shirt contest in Tijuana, Mexico to demon-
strate consciousness of guilt).
12. See Dana Littlefield, Wife's Grief Central Issue at Trial's End, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Jan. 26, 2007, http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20070126/news_7m26sommer.
html (accusing her of murder by poison, and of murder for financial gain).
13. Id. Of course, the prosecutors made sure to inform the jury that she had visited a
dance club while in Mexico. Id.
14. Id. See also Josh Mankiewicz, Marine Widow's Long Legal Odyssey, NBC NE-ws
(Apr. 25, 2008, 8:35 PM), http://www.nbcnews.comlid/24318534/ (detailing the events that
led to the woman being convicted for poisoning her husband). Her participation in a thong
contest was added to the list of conduct unseemly for a good woman, let alone a widow.
Id. The prosecution also called the decedent's mother to the stand where she expressed
her displeasure and lack of understanding for her daughter-in-law's behavior. Id.
15. Littlefield, supra note 12. The prosecution used the fact that the woman had sev-
eral sexual partners within the first two months of her husband's death to show the jury
"her true colors[.]" Josh Mankiewicz, Marine Widow's Long Legal Odyssey, NBC NEws
(Apr. 25, 2008, 8:35 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/24318534/. At least two Marines
were called to testify before the jury that they had been sexually involved with the defen-
dant shortly after her husband's death. Id.
16. Woman Accused of Killing Husband for Implants, ABC News (Jan. 6,2007), http:/
/abcnews.go.com/GMA/LegalCenter/story?id=2775274&page=1. The breast augmentation
surgery proved to be especially damning evidence in the eyes of the jury. See Josh
Mankiewicz, Marine Widow's Long Legal Odyssey, NBC News (Apr. 25, 2008, 8:35 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/24318534/ (pointing out that the defendant was consulting a
cosmetic surgeon on the same day her husband was showing signs of serious illness). The
prosecution went so far as to suggest that she was planning on using the proceeds from his
life insurance to pay for the breast augmentation. Id.
17. Littlefield, supra note 12. See also Josh Mankiewicz, Marine Widow's Long Legal
Odyssey, NBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2008, 8:35 PM), http://www.nbcnews.comlid/24318534/
(pointing out that none of these "sordid detail[s]" should have been used to incriminate the
defendant). "In a vacuum, that conduct wouldn't have merited more than some eye-rolling
and disdain. Against the backdrop of arsenic poisoning, it looked sinister . . . ." Id.
18. Littlefield, supra note 12. See Tony Perry, Release of Widow Ends Bizarre Case,
L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/19/locallme-poisonl9 (char-
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In both cases, the evidence was obviously sexually charged.' 9 How-
ever, the evidence did not directly show the defendants' guilt, but instead
invited the jury only to infer guilt. The inference the jury was encouraged
to draw was not that either defendant was guilty because they acted
guilty-as the consciousness of guilt theory of admission discussed later
would suggest-but rather, it was that they are women who violated gen-
der norms, and, therefore, committed the crime.
III. THEORY OF ADMISSION
Consciousness of guilt evidence is admitted under the Federal Rules of
Evidence or the equivalent state or common law rules.20 Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 states that all relevant evidence is admissible, while Rule of
Evidence 403 creates exceptions to the admissibility of that relevant evi-
dence due to overriding factors leading to the evidence's prejudicial dan-
ger outweighing its probative value.21 However, because the Rules of
Evidence concerning relevancy are so broad, they do not directly address
the case-by-case determination of the admissibility of consciousness of
guilt evidence, instead leaving that decision largely to the common law.2
acterizing the prosecution's case against Sommer as "tabloid-style," referring to the State's
theory that the wife killed her younger husband and then underwent breast augmentation
surgery).
19. See Littlefield, supra note 12 (listing the various evidence put before the jury in-
cluding a breast augmentation Cynthia Sommer underwent as well as a "wet t-shirt" con-
test she entered into while in Tijuana, exposing her bare chest to a crowded bar); see also
Roommates, Friends: Casey Anthony Partied While Girl Was Missing, Fox NE-ws (May 25,
2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/05/25/casey-anthonys-murder-trial-enters-second-
day/ (explaining how sexual evidence was introduced at Casey Anthony's trial, including
her partying in tight clothing, and entering into a swimsuit contest around the time her
toddler-aged daughter disappeared).
20. See Frn. R. Evio. 401, 403 (citing to the rules of evidence that cover relevancy
and exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence for prejudice, waste of time, confusion, or
other reasons); see also People v. Bennett, 79 N.Y.2d 464, 469-70 (1992) (expressing that
the admissibility of consciousness of guilt evidence is determined based on whether it is
relevant, "meaning that it has a tendency to establish the fact sought to be proved-that
defendant was aware of guilt.").
21. See Fioo. R. Evio. 401, 403 (summarizing the rules of evidence which allow admis-
sion of any relevant evidence but exclude that evidence which is more likely to mislead or
confuse the jury than be helpful). The Court may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly present-
ing cumulative evidence. Id.
22. See id. (explaining that because all relevant evidence is considered admissible, the
category is quite encompassing); United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2004)
(referencing how-if reasonable inferences can be drawn-consciousness of guilt evidence
can be relevant).
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This evidence is relevant because the jury can use the defendant's de-
meanor to determine guilt.2 3 Actions that constitute consciousness of
guilt evidence are in the words of one Court "impossible to limit,"
thereby creating an endless list of activities the prosecution can argue to
show guilt.24 Such actions include: flight,25 false alibis, 26 attempted sui-
cide, 27 failure to undergo a superstitious test,2 8 turning pale when ar-
rested,2 9 joining the military after committing a crime,"o and changing
Such evidence is admissible if the court:1 (1) determines that the evidence is offered
for a purpose other than the prove the defendant's bad character or criminal propen-
sity, (2) decides that the evidence is relevant and satisfies Rule 403, and (3) provides
an appropriate instruction to the jury as to the limited purposes for which the evidence
is introduced, if a limiting instruction is requested.
Id. at 209 (citing United States v. Mickens, 926 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1991)).
23. McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154,154-58 (1878); see People v. O'Neill, 112 N.Y. 355,
362-63 (1889) (looking to factors such as conduct and demeanor, taken with other circum-
stances, tending to indicate and aid the jury in finding guilt). "[The relevancy of conscious-
ness of guilt evidence] is largely a question of fact, rather than a question of law, for the
determination of the jury, whether particular conduct, or particular expressions of the ac-
cused, refer to a criminal offense, and spring from his consciousness of guilt." McAdory,
62 Ala. at 158.
24. See Johnson v. State, 234 S.W.3d 43, 55 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.) (citing
Lee v. State, 866 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref'd); Torres v. State,
794 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no pet.)) (emphasizing consciousness of
guilt evidence to be one of the strongest indicators of guilt); McAdory, 62 Ala. at 158.
25. See United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 26 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing that flight
evidence is only somewhat probative of guilt, the court found the defendant's flight "rele-
vant consciousness-of-guilt evidence as to both the robbery and the murder charges.").
26. See People v. Moses, 63 N.Y.2d 299, 308 (1984) (categorizing false alibis as evi-
dence "indicative of consciousness of guilt and thus of guilt itself," while acknowledging
that even innocent persons who fear wrongful convictions may provide false alibis as well).
27. People v. Duncan, 261 Ill. 339, 352-53 (1913) (noting the difference between an
attempt at suicide and an attempt to escape custody, but nonetheless asserting that both
actions seek to accomplish an escape from punishment and may be considered by a jury as
evidence of guilt).
28. WILLIAM RICHARDSON, RICHARDSON ON EVIDE-NCE § 159 (Jerome Prince ed., 7th
ed. 1948) ("The police or interested persons often employ superstitious tests as a means of
obtaining a clue to guilt, and a refusal to undergo such a test would properly be evidential
of consciousness of guilt.").
29. Lindsay v. People, 63 N.Y. 143, 155 (1875) (stating that while the defendant's act
of turning pale was little evidence of guilt, the question of whether it "was merely the
disturbance of the physical system" was for the jury to decide).
30. See People v. Mentola, 268 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1971) (citing People v. Rossini, 185
N.E.2d 831 (1962) and People v. Lobb, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959)) (indicating that joining the
military after the alleged commission of a crime is admissible as evidence of flight which
tends to show guilt). Cf Jarrell v. Commonwealth, 110 S.E. 430,436 (Va. 1922) (upholding
jury instructions that the defendant's joining the army was a "purpose formed before the
[crime)" and therefore could not be considered as evidence of flight tending to show guilt).
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appearance before trial,3 ' among others. 32
When arguing for a conviction based on the indifference or the lack of
grieving shown by the two defendants above, prosecutors were not tread-
ing new ground. Lack of emotion-usually failing to exhibit grief-after
an alleged crime, is used to show consciousness of guilt.3 3 In Greenfield v.
People,34 evidence showing the defendant did not shed tears after his
wife's death was admitted.3 1 It was also shown that when an acquain-
tance mentioned the murder, the defendant replied, "Yes, I had a load of
oats stolen."3 6 Similarly, in Allanson v. State," testimony that a defen-
dant also did not shed tears after his parents' deaths was heard. While
31. See e.g., United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d 1350, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (approving
jury instructions that allowed the jury to consider change of appearance evidence in deter-
mining consciousness of guilt); United States v. Foppe, 993 F.2d 1444, 1450 (9th Cir. 1993)
(deciding the government's statements that the defendant had changed his appearance to
avoid apprehension were not unduly prejudicial); Jackson v. State, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (Nev.
2001) (allowing jury instruction regarding change of appearance over defendant's objec-
tions that his changes in appearance happened too far after the alleged crime, and that he
did not know he was going to be in a line-up before he changed his appearance).
32. See People v. Bennett, 593 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted)
("Other conduct that has been recognized as revealing a guilty mind includes false state-
ments or alibis, coercion or harassment of witnesses, and abandonment or concealment of
evidence."). See also WuAuAM RICIARDSON, supra note 28 § 158 (indicating that the jury
is permitted to use the following conduct in determining an inference of guilt: reluctance to
have one's shoes measured, readiness to present allegedly stolen goods on request, propos-
ing marriage to one's alleged rape victim). See generally 29 AM. Juin. 21) EVIDENCE § 318
(2008) (discussing behavior that may be used to indicate a guilty mind).
33. See 41 C.J.S. HOMICIDE § 369 (2006) ("[Ejvidence regarding the defendant's lack
of emotional response to the victim's death has been admitted as probative of the defen-
dant's consciousness of guilt.").
34. 85 N.Y. 75 (1881).
35. See Greenfield v. People, 85 N.Y. 75, 85 (1881) (noting that a number of witnesses
testified that they had not seen the defendant cry the morning after his wife's murder). See
also People v. Samuels, 113 P.3d 1125, 1149 (Cal. 2005) (upholding no prosecutorial mis-
conduct for referring to defendant's lack of remorse after her husband's death); Smith v.
State, 721 S.E.2d 892, 896 (Ga. 2012) (approving introduction of evidence regarding defen-
dant's lack of emotion through testimony of an assistant medical examiner and through the
prosecutor's reference to the defendant's lack of emotion during the display of her child's
autopsy records in his closing argument); Flores v. State, 120 P.3d 1170, 1171, 1173, 1181
(Nev. 2005) (deciding that evidence of the defendant's lack of remorse after the death of
her young stepdaughter, for which she was present, "was probative to her consciousness of
guilt.").
36. Greenfield, 85 N.Y. at 85.
37. 221 S.E.2d 3 (1975).
38. Allanson v. State, 221 S.E.2d 3, 6 (1975). See also Dan E. Stigall, Prosecuting
Raskolnikov: A Literary and Legal Look at "Consciousness of Guilt" Evidence, ARMY
LAw. 54, 56 (2005) (describing actions and reactions that may be considered as evidence of
consciousness of guilt).
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in Beckworth v. State," the defendant's failure to make funeral arrange-
ments for his wife was offered as consciousness of guilt evidence.4 0
The use of defendants' alleged celebrations is not without precedent
either. Celebrating after a crime has been used to show consciousness of
guilt as well. In People v. Olanson,4 1 the defendant killed a mail carrier
who was a member of rival tribe.4 2 The following evening the defendant
engaged in a ritual celebration to commemorate the killing.4 3 The Court
allowed this as evidence of guilt under a consciousness of guilt theory.4 4
More recently, in Berryhill v. State,4 5 the Georgia Supreme Court con-
fronted similar issues.4 6 It allowed testimony that after the death of his
son, the defendant went out "partying" while friends and relatives came
to give their condolences.47 Testimony that the defendant laughed and
played with a ball outside during the wake was also presented.
Celebrating or failure to grieve, to show consciousness of guilt is used
to justify the admission of sexually charged evidence. In the Florida and
California cases referenced above, the prosecution introduced the de-
fendants' celebrations and failure to grieve-such as photos of the wo-
men at nightclubs-to demonstrate their guilt. Clearly this evidence is
problematic because it can be used in a biased fashion against women in
particular.
39. 190 S.E. 184 (1937).
40. Beckworth v. State, 190 S.E. 184, 185 (1937). See also Dan E. Stigall, Prosecuting
Raskolnikov: A Literary and Legal Look at "Consciousness of Guilt" Evidence, ARMy
LAw. 54, 56 (2005) (describing actions and reactions that may be considered as evidence of
consciousness of guilt).
41. 49 Phil. Rep. 146 (1927).
42. Id. See also John E. Hartsell, Litigating with the Law: An Introduction to the
"False Exculpatory Statements" Instruction, 29 Tm, REi'. 3, 5 (2002) (describing the Su-
preme Court's rational for consciousness of guilt).
43. Olanson, 49 Phil. Rep. 146. See also John E. Hartsell, Litigating with the Law: An
Introduction to the "False Exculpatory Statements" Instruction, 29 Taiiw REIP. 3, 5 (2002)
(describing that while there are a number of ways to show incriminatory evidence, con-
sciousness of guilt is "incredibly powerful evidence").
44. Olanson, 49 Phil. Rep. 146.
45. 285 Ga. 198 (2009).
46. Id. at 200; see also 40A AM. JUR. 20 HoMIcIDE § 453 (noting the suspect's actions
at the funeral).
47. Berryhill, 285 Ga. at 200; see also 6 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 69:2 (15th
ed.) (noting the application of the "excited utterance" rule in consciousness of guilt
findings).
48. Berryhill, 285 Ga. at 200; see also Dan E. Stigall, Prosecuting Raskolnikov: A Lit-
erary and Legal Look at "Consciousness of Guilt" Evidence, ARMY LAw. 54 (2005) (illus-
trating the history of consciousness of guilt evidence in American jurisprudence).
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IV. WHY CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT EVIDENCE IS DISCRIMINATORY
TOWARDS WOMEN
Sexually charged evidence is particularly problematic when used
against women because there is a strong potential for bias. Essentially,
this type of evidence exploits gender stereotypes in order to obtain a con-
viction. This Article will now discuss how the evidence reinforces those
stereotypes and why it is biased against women.
Women, by mere virtue of their sex, are already viewed as deviating
from male norms.49 They are defined not as individuals, but defined
based on stereotypes.50 Women are often devalued because of their gen-
der.s" This devaluation based on gender is similar to the devaluation of
an individual who commits an immoral act.52 Ultimately, "femaleness" is
considered a threat to male norms.s3
Traditional society holds a negative view of women who engage in sex-
ual activity." Put simply, promiscuity is considered a deviant behavior
49. EDwIN M. Sciiuiz, LABELINo WOMEN DIvIANr: GENDE R, STIGMA, AND) SOCIAL
CONTROL 23-24 (1983); see also J. Cindy Eson, In Praise of Macho Women: Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 U. MIAMI LAw Riev. 835, 845 (1992) (highlighting further the
incompatibility of male and female norms in society).
50. See WINNIE HAZou, Ti w SOCIAL AN) LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN 101 (1990) (ex-
plaining the need for social redefinition of women); Mary E. Kite et al., Gender Stereo-
types, in PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: A HANDBOOK OF ISSUES AND) IlEOReis 205-09
(Florence L. Denmark & Michelle A. Paludi eds., 2d ed. 2007) (discussing the impact of
gender stereotypes).
51. See Sc!iuii, supra note 49, at 22-24 (discussing the stigmatization of sexuality).
52. Id. at 23.
53. See id. at 111 (examining the impact a male dominated society has on defining
gender norms); Zenobia V. Harris, Breaking the Dress Code: Protecting Transgender Stu-
dents, Their Identities, and Their Rights, 13 ScI0LAR 149, 152 (2010) (discussing society's
judgment of those who do not conform to traditional gender norms).
54. See, e.g., LEORA TANENBAUM, SLuT! 111 (1999) (writing about the realities and
ramifications of being branded as promiscuous at a young age); Tineke M. Willemsen &
Els C. M. van Schie, Sex Stereotypes and Responses to Juvenile Delinquency, 20 Srax RotEs
623, 624-626, 636-637 (1989) (finding in part that girls receive different punishments than
boys for their delinquent behavior depending on whether the behavior is considered mas-
culine or indecent). This negative view of women who engage in sexual activity is outra-
geously illustrated in a description of a teenage girl's involuntary manslaughter charge for
the death of her newborn:
Interestingly, the state's preparation for trial involved neither of these lines of evi-
dence. Instead, subpoenas were issued to a large number of the girl's male eighth
grade classmates, who were prepared to testify to the girl's promiscuity. Regardless of
the testimony's admissibility, this line of inquiry reveals much about the state's attor-
ney's perception of societal values regarding sexuality. The boys could testify to hav-
ing had sex with her without fear of retribution (even if their stories incriminated them
for statutory rape and were reminiscent of a gang rape). Yet the same testimony,
applied to the girl, might help to convince the judge that she should be incarcerated.
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for women. 5 While women's sexual activity remains stigmatized in a
number of critical ways,5 6 men's sexual activity is celebrated.5 ' Typically,
women are defined by society as either a "slut" or a "saint."s For in-
stance the term "slut" is often used generically to refer to a "bad girl."5 9
That is, one who does not conform to socially acceptable behavior
norms.' Women who do not conform to gender norms are often also
Michelle Oberman, The Control of Pregnancy and the Criminalization of Femaleness, 7
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 1, 4 (1992).
55. SCHUR, supra note 49, at 5.
56. See Stephen A. Diamond, What Motivates Sexual Promiscuity?, Psyciioi. ToDAY
(Nov. 17, 2011, 4:24pm), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/evil-deeds/201 111/what-
motivates-sexual-promiscuity (discussing the possible motivations behind sexual promiscu-
ity). See also Barry W. McCarthy & L. Elizabeth Bodnar, The Equity Model of Sexuality:
Navigating and Negotiating the Similarities and Differences Between Men and Women in
Sexual Behaviour, Roles and Values, 20 SE-XUAL & RFLATIONSIPii TiHERAPY 225 (2005)
(observing that traditionally male and female sexual behavior has been evaluated as funda-
mentally different, paradigms that have been reinforced by the popular media, but in fact
both genders have similar sexual needs). Cf Sciiuiz, supra note 49, at 5 (observing that the
label, "deviant," is a social construct indicating society's response to a particular behavior
rather than any quality of the behavior itself). But see Michael J. Marks, Evaluations of
Sexually Active Men and Women Under Divided Attention: A Social Cognitive Approach to
the Sexual Double Standard, 30 BAsic & Armaiin'ii Soc. PsyciioL. 84 (2008) (hypothesizing
that the sexual double standard may not be empirically born out when tested in research
studies that more accurately mimic real-life gender interactions); Derek A. Kreager & Jer-
emy Staff, The Sexual Double Standard and Adolescent Peer Acceptance, 72 Soc. Psycoi.
Q. 143 (2009) (finding that empirical data supporting a sexual double standard is inconclu-
sive and often not based on actual sexual behavior).
57. TANENBAUM, supra note 54, at 23-24. But see Michael J. Marks & R. Chris Fra-
ley, Confirmation Bias and the Sexual Double Standard, 54 Sex Roi-is 19 (2006) (sug-
gesting that confirmation bias accounts for the pervasive belief in a sexual double
standard).
58. HAZOU, supra note 50. The pop star, Madonna, has seemingly transcended this
dichotomy by turning the sexual double standard on its ear. Madonna's name itself in-
vokes the imagery of the Virgin Mary and Madonna has frequently used religious imagery
in her music and videos, but Madonna also embraces an aggressive sexuality most often
associated with males. Madonna has turned these formerly mutually exclusive images into
a provocative rock star persona that has generated millions in revenue. Carla Freccero,
Our Lady of MTV: Madonna's "Like a Prayer,", 19 FEMINISM & POSTMODERNISM 163
(1992). Madonna also does not seem to have suffered in the press for her overt sexuality
when she herself became a mother. Elaine Stuart, Madonna on Motherhood, PARENTS,
http://www.parents.com/parenting/celebrity-parents/madonna-on-motherhood/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2013). However, this is likely due to the fact that she has a substantial independent
income and a cadre of public relations advisors with which she can insulate herself from
much criticism. Id.
59. TANENBAUM, supra note 54; Elizabeth Black, Good Girls, Bad Girls: The Kinki-
ness of Slut-Shaming, ON HE Issues MAG. (Feb 10, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://www.onthe
issuesmagazine.com/2010summer/2010summerBlack.php.
60. TANENBAUM, supra note 54.
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called prostitutes and are the subject of reproach.6' Indeed, sexual activ-
ity, partying, and certain dress styles are considered signs of an unfit
mother.62
Interestingly, the stigmas of promiscuity and of being an unfit mother
are closely related. Being a good mother is a sign of normality for wo-
men.6 3 An unwed mother is considered, in many segments of society, to
be a bad person.6 1 Stereotypes label her as promiscuous, and therefore
unable to take care of herself or her child." Promiscuous behavior vio-
lates society's good mother norm.6
Once an individual has been characterized as violative of social norms
like promiscuity or motherhood, that person is reassessed in a process
called retrospective interpretation.67 Their character, as well as their past
and present behaviors, are reinterpreted." Women who violate the pro-
miscuity norm are considered "bad."6 9 For example, women who are ac-
cused of criminal activity are often also accused of violating the
promiscuity norm in some form, with such labels as prostitute, witch, or
lesbian.7 0
61. SARA DELAMONf, THE SoCoILOGY OF WOMEN 122 (W. M. Williams ed., 1980).
62. Scviiu, supra note 49, at 89; Germaine Greer, These 'Slut Walk' Women Are Sim-
ply Fighting for Their Right to Be Dirty, TinE TiiLEGRAPII (May 12, 2011, 8:33pm), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/health/women-shealth/8510743/These-slut-walk-women-are-simply-
fighting-for-their-right-to-be-dirty.htmi.
63. Sci-uR, supra note 49, at 81; Eike Adams & Pippa Dell, Being a 'Good Mother': A
Discourse Analysis in Women's Experiences of Breast Cancer and Motherhood, 10 Tinm
PsycTot. OF WOMEN Sic. Ri v. 3 (2008).
64. Sciu,, supra note 49, at 84; Jen Roesch, The Single Mother Myth, SOCIAIST
WORKER (July 23, 2012), http://socialistworker.org/2012/07/23/single-mother-myth.
65. Sciiuiz, supra note 49, at 84; Jen Roesch, The Single Mother Myth, SOCIAIUSTI
WORKER (July 23, 2012), http://socialistworker.org/2012/07/23/single-mother-myth.
66. ScIIUR, supra note 49, at 83; Boykin v. Boykin, 296 S.C. 100, 102, 370 S.E.2d 884,
886 (Ct. App. 1988).
67. ScHuR, supra note 49, at 29.
68. Id.
69. "Bad" is a relative term that expresses when a girl "steps out of line." TANEN-
BAUM, supra note 54, at 110-12. The term changes with each community and has devel-
oped over time. Id. Today, being "bad" or a "slut" is when a girl appears too open or
carefree about her sexuality. Id. See generally Lisa R. Pruitt, Her Own Good Name: Two
Centuries of Talk About Chastity, 63 Mo. L. REv. 401 (2004) (discussing the chastity narra-
tive throughout time).
70. "The history of the English language shows that nearly all insulting words used
about women began with, or acquired, the meaning of prostitute." DELAMONT, supra note
61, at 122 (W. M. Williams ed., 1980). See alo Brian Donovan & Tori Barnes-Brus, Narra-
tives of Sexual Consent and Coercion: Forced Prostitution Trials in Progressive-Era New
York City, 36 LAw & Soc. INQuIRY 597 (2011) (portraying the stories of women who were
arrested for "chastity" offenses and charged with other "criminal offenses"); Elizabeth
Kaigh, Whores and Other Sex Slaves: Why the Equation of Prostitution With Sex Traffick-
ing in the William Wilberforce Reauthorization Act of 2008 Promotes Gender Discrimina-
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Sexually charged consciousness of guilt evidence is used to show fe-
male defendants violated norms. The two recent examples, cited above,
demonstrate how prosecutors accused female defendants of violating the
promiscuity and motherhood norms. In the Florida case concerning
Casey Anthony, the prosecution asserted that the defendant's claim of
being a good mother was false." The prosecution displayed pictures of
the defendant partying at a nightclub during their closing statement.7 2
They used photos to scrutinize the defendant's tattoo." In their final re-
buttal argument the prosecution asserted: "That makes her a good
mother? No, that makes her a mother. Maybe an adequate mother [sic]."
Similarly, the prosecution in the California case also introduced evidence
of the defendant partying several weeks after the alleged crime.7 4 In both
cases the defendant's sex life was used as evidence." Critically, in each
instance consciousness of guilt evidence was used not to show guilt, but to
show norm violation.
Using women's post-crime conduct as evidence is problematic. Hear-
ing the evidence could lead the fact-finder to reevaluate a woman's ear-
lier actions through a prejudiced lens. While some reactions may, in fact,
be indicative of guilt, others may just not fit into society's box of "appro-
priate responses." The real risk is the fact-finder will convict women of
crimes simply because they violated gender norms or because they are
women-not because the evidence demonstrates their guilt. Convictions
tion,, 12 SCIOLAR 139, 158 (2009) (discussing laws that limited the legal definition of
prostitute to women).
71. Linda Drane-Burdick stated that Casey Anthony was at best an "adequate
mother" for allowing her parents to provide Caylee with necessaries. Loiaconi, supra note
7.
72. Defense claims this was used to demonstrate Ms. Anthony's lack of grieving from
the death of her daughter. See Lizette Alvarez, Casey Anthony Not Guilty in Slaying of
Daughter, N.Y. TImis, July 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/us/06casey.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (announcing the not guilty verdict returned against Casey
Anthony).
73. Defense used Ms. Anthony's tattoo, "Bella vita/Beautiful life," that was obtained
shortly after Caylee's death to again show a lack of remorse. Loiaconi, supra note 7. See
also Alvarez, supra note 72 (announcing the not guilty verdict returned against Casey
Anthony).
74. Littlefield, supra note 12; Bob Considine, Wife Cleared of Murder 'Overwhelmed
With Emotion', USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 2011, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/24254002/site/to-
dayshow/ns/today-today-news/t/wife-cleared-murder-overwhelmed-emotion/#.
URh32qVpfyA.
75. Littlefield, supra note 12; Michael, supra note 2. See also Saul Relative, Casey
Anthony Case: Can Casey Anthony's Odd Behavior Just Be "Ugly Coping"?, YAHOO!
VoicEs (May 4, 2009), http://voices.yahoo.com/casey-anthony-case-casey-anthonys-odd-
behavior-3249303.html?cat=62 (discussing a possible theory of "ugly coping" present in
both Anthony's and Sommer's behavior).
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should not be based on character or gender, but on the actual commission
of the crime.
V. EXCLUDING THEORIES
There are two main theories that should be used to exclude sexually
charged consciousness of guilt evidence: (1) the evidence is more prejudi-
cial than probative, and (2) the evidence violates a female defendant's
constitutional rights. First, this Article will argue why such evidence
should be excluded under the more-prejudicial-than-probative analysis.
Next, this Article will than explain why such evidence should be excluded
on constitutional grounds.
A. More-Prejudicial-than-Probative and Consciousness of Guilt
Evidence
In turning to the application of the more-prejudicial-than-probative
standard to consciousness of guilt evidence, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence are instructive. The more-prejudicial-than-probative standard
originates at common law and is elucidated in Federal Rule of Evidence
403." The common law allows courts to exclude evidence on these
grounds as well."
Among other reasons, the Federal Rule allows a court to exclude evi-
dence if: (1) its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, or if (2) the evidence is likely to confuse the jury." The Su-
76. FEi R. Evii 403 (2011); see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S.
579, 595 (1993) (restating the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in dicta).
77. People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 777 (1988) (citing People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d
701, 704 (1976) and Uss v. Oyster Bay, 37 N.Y.2d 639, 641 (1976)). In Scarola, the New
York Court of Appeals recognized that,
[njot all relevant evidence is admissible as of right, however. Even where technically
relevant evidence is admissible, it may still be excluded by the trial court in the exer-
cise of its discretion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
that it will unfairly prejudice the other side or mislead the jury.
Id. Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals addressed, in Oyster Bay, the appropriate
standard of review for evidentiary rulings. Oyster Bay, 37 N.Y.2d at 641. The Court's
analysis in Oyster Bay shows how a particular trial court had the ability to make contradic-
tory decisions regarding admissibility without abusing its discretion. See id. ("[W]e cannot
say as a matter of law that there was an abuse of discretion by the trial court . . . . The
court here might have been justified in forbidding a demonstration .... On the other hand
it was not error as a matter of law for the court . . . to determine that plaintiffs' legitimate
interests could be sufficiently protected . . . .").
78. FE7D R. Evir. 403. According to the Advisory Committee's notes, there is "ample
support in the authorities" for the application of the exclusionary rule in four specific ar-
eas: [1] unfair prejudice, [2] confusion of issues, [3] misleading the jury, and [4] wasting
time. Id. As an example of a ruling based on unfair prejudice one should consider United
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preme Court has said that this type of evidence would "lure the fact[-
]finder into declaring guilt on a ground different from the proof specific
to the crime charged.",7  Often times this would refer to a decision made
on emotional grounds.so In a case decided before enactment of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, Judge Hand excluded evidence of a defendant's
prior rapes.8 This was to prevent the jury from convicting him simply
because he was "loathsome."8 2 He did not want the jury to convict the
States v. Rutland, 372 F.3d 543, 543 (3rd Cir. 2004). In this case, the defendant-appellant
claimed that the trail court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence. Id. The
Third Circuit determined, however, that no abuse of discretion occurred, recognizing, from
the Advisory Committed Notes, how an "improper basis" is not necessarily one based on
emotion. Id. In this case, the appellate court addressed an issue that focused on the appar-
ently impressive credentials of the state's handwriting expert. Id. The court determined
that "[j]urors may properly take an expert's impressive experience and credentials into
account when determining the weight of the expert's testimony." Id.
79. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). Also, at least one commenta-
tor has noted how "Rule 403 is highly discretionary." Aviva Orenstein, Propensity or Ster-
eotype?: A Misguided Evidence Experiment in Indian Country, 19 CORNELL J.L. & Pun.
Poi.y 173, 179-80 (2009). While discussing Rule 403 within the context of Rule 413 and
Rule 414, this commentator further noted that "[c]ourts have forsaken the traditional, dis-
cretionary gate-keeping role of Rule 403 and substituted a presumption of admissibility."
Id. (citing United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
80. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180. While this analysis developed around the Federal
Rules of Evidence and within our federal court system, it has influenced state courts as
well. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 727 S.E.2d 751, 757 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). In Collins, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals stated that "[tihis definition of unfair prejudice was
taken originally from the Advisory Committee Notes to the formerly identical federal rule
403." Id. (citing State v. Alexander, 401 S.E.2d 146, 149 (S.C. 1991)).
81. United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1944). In Krulewitch, Judge
Hand seemingly anticipated Rule 403 stating, for instance,
As has been said over and over again, the question is always whether what it will
contribute rationally to a solution is more than matched by its possibilities of confu-
sion and surprise, by the length of time and the expense it will involve, and by the
chance that it will divert the jury from the facts which should control their verdict."
Id. Within the Second Circuit, at least, the authority of the Krulewitch decision continues
to influence court decisions. See United States v. Colombo, 808 F.2d 711, (2d Cir. 1990)
(relying on Krulewiich in a Rule 403 analysis). In relevant part, the Second Circuit stated
that in Krulewitch "we observed that its prejudicial effects outweighed its probative value
because it tends to muddle the jury, and to lead them to convict the accused because he
was in general so loathsome." Id. (citing and quoting Krulewitch, 145 F.2d at 80) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
82. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d at 80; see also Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused's
Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(B), 78 TEMP. L. RFV. 201, 243 (2005) (analyz-
ing the different ways consciousness of guilt evidence is deemed admissible in court:
"Judge Werner's version of the rule presumes the inadmissibility of uncharged misconduct
and allows only well-recognized exceptions to the general prohibition. Judge Parker's rule
presumes the admissibility uncharged misconduct, except when offered solely for the rea-
son of proving the accused's bad character.").
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defendant simply because he was bad person; rather, he wanted to ensure
a conviction based on the crime the defendant allegedly committed."
The probative value of evidence is contended to be synonymous with rel-
evancy.84 In 1963, the New York Court of Appeals expanded upon this
contention, asserting in People v. Yazum" that evidence is relevant if it
would "tend to convince that the fact sought to be established is so."8 6
1. Application to Consciousness of Guilt Evidence
Consciousness of guilt evidence, like any other evidence, is subject to
the more-prejudicial-than-probative analysis." In conducting this analy-
sis, the court weighs the probative value of the evidence-including the
prosecution's need for the evidence-against its prejudicial effect." The
probative value of consciousness of guilt evidence and the prejudicial ef-
fect of consciousness of guilt evidence have an especially unique prejudi-
83. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d at 80; see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476
(1948) (stating that prior criminal acts tend to "overpersuade" the jury and deny the ac-
cused "a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge."); Eva S. Nilsen, The Crim-
inal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 Gro. J. LE GAL E-riics 1 (1994)
(discussing "legitimate advocacy" that can lead to using biases in order to kept information
from reaching the jury.).
84. 5 RoiEir BARKER & VINCEEr ALEXANDER, WEsr's NEw YORK PRAC1.ICE Si.
Ribs 110 (1996); see Dan E. Stigall, Prosecuting Raskolnikov: A Literary and Legal Look at
"Consciousness of Guilt" Evidence, ARMY LAw. 54, 56 (2005) (stating that actions, even
banal acts, may be admissible if they "may be indicative of a criminal's consciousness of
guilt.").
85. 196 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1963).
86. Id. at 264; see Robert A. Baker, Evidence, 44 SYRACUse, L. REv. 329, 353 (1993)
(noting that evidence which is "held to constitute consciousness of guilt" is viewed as
weak).
87. United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d 201, 209 (2nd Cir. 2004); see also People v. Feld-
man, 296 N.Y. 127, 138-39 (1947) ("the evidence of defendant's refusal to permit an au-
topsy upon the body of his wife .. . was not only of doubtful probative value as proof of the
defendant's consciousness of guilt but was prejudicial to the defendant's rights before thejury."); Michael Avery, Prejudice vs. Probative Value, Philadelphia Style, 50 Si. LouIs U.
L.J. 1147, 1153 (2006) (noting that the question of how a judge measures probative value
and prejudice are "discretionary judgments"); Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The
Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
425, 462 (2010) (stating that in order to avoid unfair prejudice judges must use their "dis-
cretionary authority to exclude evidence."); Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused's
Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(B), 78 TiLMP. L. Riv. 201, 243 (2005)
("[Mlost modern judges believe that evidence of predisposition to criminal acts is some-
how very unfair to the accused.").
88. See Fi. R. Evio. 403 (excluding relevant evidence if the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice); see also United States v. Stout,
509 F.3d 796, 796 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that "even if evidence of defendant's prior bad
act was subjectively critical, those circumstances did not make the bad act evidence objec-
tively more probative . . . .").
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cial effects on female defendants; these types of evidence are subjected to
specific standards, as discussed below.
a. Probative Value of the Evidence
Courts have held that consciousness of guilt evidence has probative
value.89 The fact-finder is allowed to draw the inference that defendant's
consciousness of guilt caused him or her to act guilty and therefore they
must be guilty.9 o For example, a fact-finder is allowed to draw the infer-
ence that if a defendant fled after a crime, they were fleeing because they
knew they were guilty.9"
Even though consciousness of guilt evidence is generally accepted as
probative, some courts have argued against this concept." In People v.
Troche," the New York Court of Appeals asserted that "[n]aturally
enough, the courts have consistently acknowledged the weakness of this
type of evidence, reflecting a consciousness of guilt . . . ."9 This weak-
ness is qualified by the varying ways individuals may react in the after-
math of a crime.95
Chief Judge Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court gave a
paradigmatic example addressing consciousness of guilt evidence and
how people can react in different and unexpected ways after crime.96 To
illustrate his contention, Shaw referred to an incident where a man stood
89. See People v. Bennett, 79 N.Y.2d 464, 470 (App. Div. 1992) (stating evidence of
consciousness of guilt may be admissible if relevant).
90. See United States v. Johnson, 624 F.3d 815, 820-21 (7th Cir. 2010) (indicating that
jurors could use recorded conversations of defendant to find consciousness of guilt even
though defendant did not explicitly threaten informant).
91. See United States v. Obi, 239 F.3d 662, 665 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that "the jury's
consideration of evidence of flight requires that it be able-from the evidence-to link
such flight to consciousness of guilt of the crime for which the defendant is charged.").
92. See Charges to Jury & Requests to Charge in Crim. Case § 4:38 N.Y. (2012) (rea-
soning that "an innocent person may attempt to extricate himself from a situation by deny-
ing incriminating evidence even though he knows it can be truthfully explained or by
fleeing from an accuser because of fear of wrongful conviction.").
93. 221 N.Y.S.2d 228, 231 (App. Div. 1961).
94. Id. at 231.
95. State v. Beckner, 198 N.W. 643, 646 (Iowa 1924); see also Greenfield v. People, 85
N.Y. 75, 86 (1881) (discussing the different reactions that could be displayed by both guilty
and innocent people after a crime); Andrew Palmer, Guilty and the Consciousness of Guilt:
The Use of Lies, Flight and Other 'Guilty Behaviour' in the Investigation and Prosecution of
Crime, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 95, 119 (1997) (pointing out that an array of different emo-
tions plague both the innocent and guilty after a crime).
96. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 316-17 (1850) (explaining how
crimes can be proven based on the varying "feelings, passions, and propensities under
which parties act . . . .").
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accused of the murder of his niece." He disappeared and returned with a
woman deceptively posing as his niece." The allegedly murdered niece
later turned up alive.99 He had not killed her, despite the fact he had
acted as many assume a guilty man would act.'" This anecdote demon-
strates how a person's actions can be qualified with consciousness of
guilt.' 0
Consciousness of guilt evidence's low probative value means the prose-
cution's need for evidence is not a major factor. Therefore, if the prose-
cution needs the evidence to convict, they do not have a case strong
enough for conviction."o2 Indeed, some jurisdictions will not allow a con-
viction based on consciousness of guilt evidence alone because its proba-
tive value is too low.'0 3  For instance, mere flight cannot sustain a
conviction.' The New York Court of Appeals' ruling in People v.
97. Id. at 317.
98. Id.; see People v. Moses, 63 N.Y.2d 299, 309 (1984) (explaining that flight may
result in a presumption of consciousness of guilt. The court states, "[w]here an accom-
plice's testimony is bolstered only by consciousness of guilt, this court has been reluctant to
find the necessary corroboration[,]" and "[t]he bare evidence of consciousness of
guilt . . . [is] so inherently weak that it [does] not satisfy the corroboration requirement of
CPL 60.22(,J" which speaks further to the lack of probative value held by consciousness of
guilt evidence).
99. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 316 (1850).
100. See id. at 317 (showing how the accused's actions reflected that of one attempting
to conceal criminal behavior).
101. See id. at 316.
102. See People v. Ellis, 65 Cal.2d 529, 537-38 (1966) (asserting that "[bjy acting like a
guilty person, a man does not testify to his guilt but merely exposes himself to the drawing
of inferences from circumstantial evidence of his state of mind."); People v. May, 290 N.Y.
369, 375 (1943) (noting how the court ordered a new trial because the defendant's alleged
consciousness of guilt was not probative.); see also United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036,
1049 (5th Cir. 1977) (consciousness of guilt's probative value as circumstantial evidence
depends upon the degree of confidence from which inferences could be drawn. The Court
details facts for inferences related to flight.); Herring v. State, 501 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla. 1986)
("A defendant's behavior is circumstantial evidence probative of his consciousness of guilt,
and ultimately guilt itself, only when it can be said that behavior is 'susceptible of no prima
facie explanation except consciousness of guilt.'").
103. See People v. May, 49 N.E.2d 486, 488 (N.Y. 1943) (explaining how the court
believed that the evidence of consciousness of guilt was regarded "as a whole of doubtful
legal sufficiency . . . ."); see also Commonwealth v. Matos, 394 Mass. 563, 565--66 (1985)
(instructing jury that they "could not convict the defendant solely on evidence of flight as
consciousness of guilt.").
104. See United States v. Obi, 239 F.3d 662, 665 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that the jury
must consider all evidence to connect flight with consciousness of guilt); Justice v. State,
530 N.E.2d 295, 297 (Ind. 1988) ("[Ejvidence of flight [is] not probative unless tied to some
other evidence which is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent."), People v. Kidd, 102
N.E.2d 141, 144 (Ill. 1951) ("[Tjhe fact that he fled when approached by police officers,
raises no legal presumption that he is guilty of the particular crime charged in the
indictment.").
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Reddy"os for example, asserted that flight is not probative enough to cor-
roborate a co-conspirator's inculpatory statements, which New York re-
quires for a conviction. 0 6 In People v. Kidd,107 the Illinois Supreme
Court also argued that flight, coupled with other vague evidence, was not
enough to sustain a conviction.' 08
b. Prejudicial Effects of Consciousness of Guilt Evidence
Consciousness of guilt evidence can have great influence on a fact-
finder."o' Courts have recognized that this influence may be "pushed too
far" 1 o when it leads a jury to convict a defendant based on their charac-
ter and not the facts."' This risk has prompted some courts to exclude
consciousness of guilt evidence as more-prejudicial-than-probative. 1 12
The New York Court of Appeals is one court that has excluded con-
sciousness of guilt evidence for being more-prejudicial-than-probative." 3
In People v. Feldman,"4 the defendant was accused of murdering his wife
with poison"' and refusing to permit an autopsy.1 6 The court held that
105. 261 N.Y. 479 (1933).
106. Id. (stating that flight is evidence of "slight value").
107. 102 N.E.2d 141 (III. 1951).
108. Id. at 144.
109. See People v. May, 290 N.Y. 369, 373-74 (1943) (discussing how the jury "may
well have been influenced" by "consciousness of guilt" evidence).
110. People v. Troche, 221 N.Y.S. 2d 228, 231 (App. Div.1961) (citing People v. Leyra,
1 N.Y.2d 199, 209 (1956) (stating that evidence reflecting a consciousness of guilt "may
easily be pushed too far.")) (holding that where there is "insufficien[t] [] probative evi-
dence to sustain the conviction" and considering consciousness of guilt evidence alone may
have led to the possibility of prejudice); see also People v. Nowakowski, 221 A.D. 521, 523
(N.Y. 1927) (showing that courts have long recognized that consciousness of guilt evidence
"may easily be pushed too far . . . .").
111. See United States. v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 514 (2nd Cir. 1977) (citing United
States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1091 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that evidence, such as con-
sciousness of guilt, that elicits "a strong emotional or inflammatory impact" and lacks pro-
bative value "may pose a risk of unfair prejudice because it 'tends to distract' the jury from
the issues in the case and 'permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and punish the
bad man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case shows
actually happened."').
112. Id. at 527 n.1 (explaining the standard to which relevant evidence can be ex-
cluded); see FED. R. Civ. P. 403 (outlining that evidence may be excluded "if its probative
value is [] outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .").
113. See People v. Feldman, 296 N.Y. 127, 139 (1947) (holding that "[the] defendant's
refusal to permit an autopsy upon the body of his wife" lacked probative value of evidence
of his consciousness of guilt and was found to be prejudicial); see also People v. Cheek, 503
N.Y.S.2d 876 (App. Div. 1986) (explaining that evidence of guilt could be admitted be-
cause it had no prejudicial effect).
114. 296 N.Y. 127 (1947).
115. Id. at 130.
116. Id. at 137.
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this refusal should have been excluded.' 17 The court explained, "[ijn any
event, the danger of undue emphasis being attached to the testimony out-
balances any legitimate probative force it could have had.""' The court
ordered a new trial."19
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence federal courts engage in a more-
prejudicial-than probative analysis.120 The Second Circuit's ruling in
United States v. Perezl2 ' expressed that a lower court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that consciousness of guilt evidence-that the defen-
dant coerced a witness-was not more prejudicial than probative.12 2
Though, the court did engage in the analysis.123
c. Prejudicial Effects Against Female Defendants
There is little case law concerning evidence that is specifically prejudi-
cial against women. Even so, courts have examined gender when con-
ducting a more-prejudicial-than-probative analysis, utilizing gender as a
reason for excluding such evidence. For example, in People v. Martin,
the California Court of Appeals held that obscene letters and writings in
possession of a female defendant should be excluded because they had
nothing to do with the crime charged, and were therefore, prejudicial.' 25
She was on trial for bombing the home of a superior court judge. 2 6 In
making reference to the gender of the defendant, the court went on to
discount the evidence as being nothing more than a "tende[ncy] to show
[defendant] to be a most depraved and vicious woman." 127 The court left
unsaid what was obscene in those letters and writings; however, the use of
the terms "obscene" and "depraved" seem to indicate it was of a sexual
nature.128 The jury would have been unable to try her only for the crime
117. Id. at 130, 139.
118. Id. at 127, 137.
119. Id. at 127, 140.
120. United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d 201, 209-10 (2nd Cir. 2004).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 210.
123. Id.
124. 108 P. 1034 (Cal. Ct. App. 1910).
125. See id. at 1038 (noting that irrelevant matters are prohibited from being heard by
a jury).
126. Id. at 1034-35,
127. Id. at 1038,
128. See id. (stating that the letters presented at the trial were obscene and conveyed
the perception that the defendant, Isabella Martin, was a depraved and vicious woman);
see also AM. HERIffAGE DicnIONARY (5th ed. 2011), available at http://www.ahdictionary.
com/word/search.html?q =obscene (defining "obscene" as "offensive to accepted standards
of decency . . . of or relating to materials that can be regulated or criminalized because
their depiction of nudity, sex, or excretion is patently offensive .... " Defining "depraved"
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charged after reading the letters.'2 9 For this reason, and others, the ver-
dict was overturned.' 30
More recently in a civil case for negligence, the Eighth Circuit directly
confronted the issue of sexually charged evidence with regard to female
defendants. In Littleton v. McNeely,' 3 ' a lawsuit over a boat collision,132
evidence capturing the behavior of the defendant was held to be more
prejudicial than probative."' Photographs taken of defendant socializing
with third parties on the boat at a location known as "Party Cove" were
at issue1 34 The photographs offered as evidence did not clearly illustrate
whether the defendant and third parties were drinking alcoholic bever-
ages.13 s Nor were the photographs marked in a way to determine the
date or time when they were taken."' The photographs also showed the
defendant and several other women topless.13 7 The court said jurors
as "morally corrupt or perverted."). Note the sexual connotations of both the words "ob-
scene" and "depraved."
129. See Martin, 108 P. at 1038 (noting that the inclusion of the letters as evidence in
Isabella Martin's trial created prejudice against her and made it virtually impossible for her
to receive a fair trial); see also ScuiuR, supra note 49, at 1-2 (noting that women are pro-
foundly affected by the prevailing descriptions of deviance in our society). The author
states that the definition of deviance in our culture can make women feel a sense of shame,
harm their reputation, and ultimately reinforce the disparity between the sexes. Id. at 1-2.
130. See Martin, 108 P. at 1038 (ruling that due to the wrongful admission of the let-
ters and the resulting prejudice against Isabella Martin, the verdict of the lower court
should be overturned). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 403 (mandating that even if evidence
has some relevance, it should be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the possi-
bility of unfair prejudice).
131. 562 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2009).
132. See id. at 883 (affirming the origins of the lawsuit, and stating the lawsuit
stemmed from a collision between two boats on the Lake of the Ozarks in Missouri in
2005).
133. See id. at 888-89 (stating that the court saw no probative value to the photo-
graphs of women that were displayed at trial and noting that they were, in fact, potentially
prejudicial). The photographs in question showed women drinking alcohol and showed
them without their bathing suit tops on. Id.; see also Lee v. Bennett, 927 F. Supp. 97, 101
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that prejudicial evidence should not be entered into court pro-
ceedings, including prosecutor's summations, because it inhibits the jury's ability to fairly
determine someone's guilt or innocence).
134. McNeely, 562 F.3d at 888-89. The photos in question were salvaged from a cam-
era that was in a boat belonging to Robert Smedley. Id. at 888.
135. Id. "The photos do not reveal whether the bottles contain alcoholic or non-alco-
holic beverages. Even if the photos did show Gerri Littleton drinking alcohol, we fail to
see how that fact would have had any significant impact on the verdict." Id.
136. Id. at 888-89. "[T]here is no date stamp on the photos, and McNeely offered no
evidence to establish whether the photos were taken on the day of the collision or another
day that weekend." Id. at 888.
137. See id. at 888-89 (clarifying that the photos of Gerri Littleton and Lisa Smedley
provide a "potentially prejudicial depiction").
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might find the photos "lewd, offensive, or immoral"13 and displaying
them would prejudice the jury against the parties. 13  The court held that
the district court was right to exclude the photos. 14 0
2. When Excluding Theories Should be Used
Courts should exclude sexually charged consciousness of guilt evi-
dence, 1 41 because the probative value of this evidence is low while the
potential for prejudice is high. 142 As the court argued in Webster, people
react differently to tragedy, thus qualifying the probative value of evi-
dence of their reaction as rather low. 14 3 As a result, some courts will not
uphold a conviction based on that type of evidence alone.14 4 On the
other hand, the potential for prejudice against accused women when con-
sidering sexually charged consciousness of guilt evidence is very high. As
138. Id. The court reasoned that if the photos had any probative value at all, the
district court "certainly did not abuse its discretion by determining any minor probative
value was far outweighed by the potential for prejudice resulting from the jury's disap-
proval of the photos." Id. at 889.
139. Id. at 888. The court noted that even if the pictures clearly depicted the women
drinking alcohol, it would not have a significant impact on the jury. Id.
140. See id. at 888-89 (asserting the admittance of the photographs into evidence was
potentially prejudicial as the actions could be considered lewd, offensive, or immoral and
had no probative value).
141. See generally Dan E. Stigall, Prosecuting Raskolnikov: A Literary and Legal
Look at "Consciousness Of Guilt" Evidence, ARMY LAw. 54 (2005) (discussing the use of
disposing of the evidence, giving false exculpatory statements, fleeing the scene, and dis-
playing an unusually nervous demeanor, as four deeply rooted examples of consciousness
of guilt evidence which is widely accepted in U.S. criminal law).
142. See United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 598 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The slight
probative value of these statements [threats against the prosecutor] notwithstanding, a
court must still consider whether that probative value substantially outweighs any resulting
prejudicial effect."). The Sixth Circuit went on to weigh the value of the statements as
evidence of the accused consciousness of guilt determining that because he was not
charged with obstruction of justice, the threats had no relation to his charged conduct and
the effects outweighed their probative value. Id. at 598-99.
143. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 316-17 (1850) (overruled on other
grounds).
To the same head may be referred all attempts on the part of the accused to suppress
evidence, to suggest false and deceptive explanations, and to cast suspicion, without
just cause, on other persons: all or any of which tend somewhat to prove consciousness
of guilt, and, when proved, to exert an influence against the accused. But this consid-
eration is not to be pressed too urgently; because an innocent man, when placed by
circumstances in a condition of suspicion and danger, may resort to deception in the
hope of avoiding the force of such proofs.
Id.
144. See People v. Kidd, 102 N.E.2d 141,144 (111. 1951) (overturning Kidd's conviction
because evidence of flight, which tends to prove guilt, was not enough when considering all
evidence).
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discussed in Littleton, the court specifically excluded sexually charged evi-
dence because of the potential for prejudice.' 4 5 Once a woman has been
shown violating social norms, the fact-finder is likely to reevaluate all of
her actions based on that violation, including actions in the past and in
the present. 14 6 Including this type of evidence effectively encourages
fact-finders to punish women for deviating from social standards.' 7 By
allowing gendered expectations to cloud their reasoning, the jury is likely
to convict female defendants for being a "bad" person-a notion which
Kruelwich and Martin prohibit.' 4 8
Therefore, because of the low probative value and the high prejudicial
effect, courts should exclude sexually charged consciousness of guilt evi-
dence when used against women. This, however, is not the only ground
for exclusion; several constitutional constraints exist that also warrant ex-
clusion of this evidence.
B. Constitutional Constraints
It is well established that the use of race, ethnicity, and religion to con-
vict a defendant violates his or her constitutional rights.' 49 Courts have
declared these abuses as violative of due process rights, equal protection,
and the Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.'50 Although they have
used different methods of reasoning, courts have consistently held that
the improper injection of race, ethnicity, or religion into a trial is uncon-
stitutional. However, case law regarding the improper use of gender is
less common, and the case law that does exist suggests the use of gender
to obtain a conviction also violates a defendant's rights.1 s'
145. Littleton v. McNeely, 562 F.3d 880, 888-89 (8th Cir. 2009).
146. See SCHUR, supra note 49, at 29 ("Once an individual has been identified as a
deviant (of whatever sort), observers tend to reassess the person's overall character and
specific behaviors-past and present-in light of that new, devaluing identity.").
147. Id.
148. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (explaining that when
examining a defendant's illicit behavior, individuals tend to generalize that behavior "into
bad character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act [I charged.").
149. United States v. Nobari, 574 F.3d 1065, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing evi-
dence of ethnicity); see also United States v. Steele, 298 F.3d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 2002) (ex-
plaining that "when the defendant objects to alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the
standard of review is abuse of discretion.").
150. United States v. Cabrera, 222 F.3d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 2000); see Bains v. Cambra,
205 F.3d 964, 974 (9th Cir. (2000) (talking about the use of religious affiliation as evi-
dence); see also Nobari, 574 F.3d at 1072-73 (elaborating on the use of religion as
evidence).
151. See Lee v. Bennett, 927 F. Supp. 97, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing the use of
gender bias with the jury); see also E. LeFevre, Annotation, Prejudicial Effect of Counsel's
Addressing Individually or by Name Particular Juror During Argument, 55 A.L.R.2d 1198
710 [Vol. 15:689
2013] SEXUALLY CHARGED EVIDENCE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED
In United States v. Nobari,15 2 the Ninth Circuit held that a trial court
cannot hear evidence concerning the ethnicity of the defendants.1 3 The
trial court heard evidence of the role different ethnic groups-such as
Mexicans and Middle Easterners-play in drug trafficking."' In United
States v. Cabrera,"' another Ninth Circuit case, the conviction was re-
versed because of appeals to ethnic prejudice." 6 A witness' references to
Cubans and the techniques Cuban drug dealers used were held to be im-
proper." In United States v. Doe,"' the D.C. Circuit overturned a con-
viction based on racial evidence." The prosecution elicited evidence
concerning Jamaican drug dealers during the trial.16 0 The prosecutor spe-
cifically referred to that evidence in his summation.'
There is little case law concerning whether the prohibition against ra-
cial, ethnic and religious evidence also extends to evidence concerning
gender. However, in Lee v. Bennett,16 2 a habeas corpus case, a federal
district court considered how a specific appeal to the "ladies of the jury"
might have affected the outcome of the case.163 In the same case, a male
defendant was convicted of rape in a second trial, after his first trial en-
(1957) (discussing other forms of singling out jurors, in particular, by name or otherwise
individually).
152. 574 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2009).
153. Id. at 1076.
154. See id. at 1071-73 (referencing the testimony of the informant who described the
role Mexicans and Middle Easterners play in drug trafficking). The informant gave de-
tailed information on what the Mexicans' role allegedly was in drug trafficking, stating that
Mexicans were the "cookers"-the ones who turned the pseudoephedrine into
methamphetamine. Id. at 1072. The informant also stated that the role of the Middle
Easterners was allegedly to get the pseudoephedrine into the United States and into the
hands of the Mexicans. Id.
155. 222 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2000).
156. Id. at 591. Because the lead detective interjected prejudicial material that had
little to no probative value, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision on
unfair prejudice under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.; FDI. R. Eviu. 403.
157. Cabrera, 222 F.3d at 596-97. "[Rleferences to racial, ethnic, or religious groups
are not only improper and prejudicial but are reversible error." Id. at 594.
158. 903 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
159. Id. at 29. Because the prosecutor's remarks kindled racial predilections, these
types of statements "'can violently affect a juror's impartiality."' Id. at 28.
160. Id. at 17-18. The prosecutor called several witnesses who testified about drugs
associated with a Jamaican and Jamaican drug dealers. Id. One of these witness, a detec-
tive, described how the Jamaican drug dealers operated and how they "have had a phe-
nomen[al] impact on the drug trade in the District of Columbia." Id. at 18.
161. Id. at 23-24.
162. 927 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
163. Id. at 106 ("[Tlhe prosecutor was allowed by the trial court by this and other
remarks, to create an unwholesome atmosphere in which it could hardly be expected that
the jury deliberations would concentrate on the facts.").
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ded in a mistrial. 1 6 4 Accusations of gender bias were made against the
prosecutor.1 6 5 The court believed that the prosecutor was attempting to
appeal to the gender bias of female jurors because, in the first trial, the
female jurors had voted to acquit the defendant. 166 The court criticized
the prosecutor for using the word "insensitive,"1 6 7 and said it was "a cur-
rent buzz word used on TV talk shows and soap operas to describe mas-
culine reactions to complaints by women."68 This statement was an appeal
to gender bias among the jurors.'69 The prosecutor also made specific
appeals to the "the women who constituted a majority of the jurors" dur-
ing closing arguments.o7 0 The court overturned the conviction based on
the prosecutor's appeals to female jurors.1 '
When the prosecution introduces sexually charged consciousness of
guilt evidence against women it is appealing to gender prejudice. They
call the defendant's sex to attention because women are already devalued
in a way similar to those who commit bad acts.17 2 The prosecutor in the
ubiquitous Casey Anthony trial tried to appeal to the prejudice that bad
mothers are bad people, when he argued that the Casey Anthony was not
a good mother.'7 3 When prosecutors show pictures of a defendant in a
164. Id. at 100.
165. See id. at 104 ("It is clear to this court, upon consideration of the People's entire
summation, that the intent of the prosecutor was to specifically concentrate of [sic] the
women of the jury and to focus them on matters having little to do with the evidence of the
case.").
166. See id. at 100 ("In some fashion the participants ascertained that the first trial
jury, which consisted of seven women and five men had deadlocked six to six with six
women voting to acquit.").
167. Id. at 105.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 105 n.3. The court defined the term "insensitive" with regard to the testi-
mony of "J's" former employer who stated that "J" seemed cheerful and unaffected follow-
ing the attack. The prosecutor used the term in order to emphasize why so many women
go without reporting rape. Id.
170. Id at 105. The court also sustained an objection to the aforementioned state-
ment as well as the statement that the subject matter before the jury was "'even more
difficult for female jurors than for male jurors."' Id.
171. See id. at 106 ("This misconduct having so infected the search for truth, this
Court concludes as a matter of law that the conviction in the second trial justifies no confi-
dence in its reliability.").
172. See SCHUR, supra note 49 (quoting feminist writer Mary Daly on the society's
stigma of women as deviants, "[t]o be female is to be deviant by definition on the prevail-
ing culture;" as well as social psychologist Judith Long Laws who stated, "[m]ales as a
group constitute the dominant class and females are the deviant class . . . . In our society
male is normal (not merely different) and female is deviant, or Other.").
173. Loiaconi, supra note 7 (stating that the defendant could not be considered a good
mother merely because she provided basic necessities-food, clothing, and shelter-for her
daughter).
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revealing dress 7 4 or tell of her participation in a wet t-shirt contest, 7 s
they are bringing the defendant's sexuality to attention. The prosecution
is essentially arguing that the female defendant should be convicted
solely because she is a woman. The prosecutors in in Nobari17 6 and
Doe'7 made a similar appeal to convict the defendant because of his
ethnicity. In Lee, the court specifically held that injecting gender issues
into a case violates a defendant's rights."' A court could exclude this
evidence under the Fourth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Fifth
Amendment's right to a fair trial, or whichever other constitutional
grounds it choses.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sexually charged consciousness of guilt evidence should be excluded
when used against women. This type of evidence encourages fact-finders
to find the accused guilty, not because they believe she committed the
crime charged, but because of her "deviance" from socialized gendered
expectations.
Unlike the evidence in Berryhill and Olanson, sexually charged evi-
dence presents special problems with regards to women. As the court
recognized in Littleton, once sexually charged evidence is introduced fact-
finders will have trouble deciding only the case at bar and may punish
women for other reasons. Furthermore, In Lee, the court recognized that
it violated a defendant's rights to interject gender into a trial.
For these reasons, courts should exclude this evidence under a more-
prejudicial-than-probative analysis. This type of evidence has little pro-
bative value as it encourages fact-finders to decide guilt on impermissible
grounds, namely the violation of gender norms. It should also be ex-
cluded on constitutional grounds since it is impermissible to argue for
conviction based on a defendant's sex. Yet, sexually charged evidence
often results in convictions based on the defendant's sexual departures
from socialized gender norms. Courts should exclude this evidence and
ensure that convictions are based on facts, not on social stereotypes.
174. Michael, supra note 2; Loiaconi, supra note 7.
175. Littlefield, supra note 12.
176. See United States v. Nobari, 574 F.3d 1065, 1076 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining the
court's holding that the "[tihe district court abused its discretion by admitting the testi-
mony and allowing the closing argument concerned with ethnic generalizations . . . .").
177. See United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (proposing how ra-
cially charged statements can influence the impartiality of a fact-finder).
178. See Lee v. Bennett, 927 F. Supp. 97, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the prose-
cutor's actions to appeal to the female members of the jury was held as a violation of the
defendant's due process rights).
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